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1. Introduction 
Falling international grain prices and increasing imports of grain into Western Europe in the 1870’s and 
1880’s caused falling profitability for grain producers and falling land prices in West European countries. 
The grain invasion provoked different responses in different countries. While some countries, notably 
Denmark and the UK, stuck to free trade in agricultural commodities, others such as France, Germany 
and Sweden imposed tariffs to protect landowners.  
According to Kevin O’Rourke the varying responses to the grain invasion depended on its impact on 
land rents and the role of agriculture in national economic life.1 In the UK the weight of the agricultural 
sector in the national economy was already much reduced and in Denmark farmers were already well on 
their way in switching over to animal produce. In contrast, on the European continent cereal production 
was much more important. The response to the grain invasion probably also had something to do with 
the political clout of landowners. In a classical study Alexander Gerschenkron argued that in Germany 
agrarian protectionism only benefited a minority of relatively large landowners specializing in bread-grain 
production.2 According to Gerschenkron, small farmers did not gain much from agricultural protection 
even though they produced grain, since they used their grain produce primarily for own consumption and 
fodder. Against Gerschenkron, Steven Webb has argued that the output mix did not differ much between 
small farms and large farms and that animal produce also received substantial tariff protection in 
Germany.3  
In Sweden as in Germany, the campaign for grain tariffs was primarily conducted by large landowners, 
specializing in bread-grain production. The majority of small farmers typically specialized in animal 
husbandry, which was much less exposed to overseas competition. Agrarian protectionism was filled with 
controversy from the beginning. In the debates on trade policy in the 1880’s critics pointed out that grain 
tariffs primarily served the interests of large landowners in southern and mid-eastern Sweden, specializing 
in producing bread-grain. In answer, to win over the majority of small farmers, the protectionists also 
campaigned for the introduction of tariffs on maize and pork. Maize was considered a substitute for oats 
in the feeding of pigs and adherents of protectionism argued that the maize tariff would primarily benefit 
small farmers since oats was their most important crop. However, as free traders pointed out, pig farming 
was also more important for small and middle-sized farms than for large farms, and the feeding of pigs 
was made more expensive by the maize tariff. Moreover, the most important source of revenue for small 
farmers derived from milk production which was unprotected.4  
After the intense debates over tariffs in the 1880’s the controversy faded during the general economic 
upswing in the 1890’s, when the protectionist system had been settled. A new controversy over food 
                                                 
1  O’Rourke, ”European Grain Invasion”. 
2  Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy. 
3  Webb, ”Agricultural Protection”. 
4  Gellerman, Staten och jordbruket, pp. 17–43. 
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tariffs was again brought to the fore around 1910.5 Many male workers now had a yearly income 
exceeding 800 kr and had thereby gained the right to vote in parliamentary elections. Accordingly, the 
Social Democrats could now muster a sizable representation in the parliament. Increasing unemployment 
in the wake of the economic crises in 1907 resulted in hardships for many workers. Food tariffs, in 
particular grain tariffs, were now singled out for critique by the Social Democrats in alliance with the so 
called Norrland liberals, representing small farmers from northern Sweden, where grain production had 
always been of marginal importance. However, the critique of grain tariffs proved to be half-hearted since 
the Social Democrats feared that abolishing agricultural tariffs would lead to demands from farmers for 
the dismantling of tariffs also on industrial products. The Social Democrats feared that many industries 
were dependent on tariffs, and that their withdrawals would lead to increased unemployment. In addition, 
grain tariffs were now an important source of revenue for the government and it was believed that their 
withdrawal would lead to a fiscal crisis. This would in turn have necessitated compensatory increases in 
other taxes. Another consideration was that Social Democrats were divided on the issue. Many small 
farmers had now joined the party and they were generally for agrarian protectionism.  
The only practical result of the controversy over agrarian tariffs was that the maize tariff was abolished 
in 1911. Critics of food tariffs were hampered by lack of factual knowledge6 of conditions in agriculture 
and the probable impact of a dismantling of agrarian tariffs on different farmers. Data collected in the 
1910’s and the early 1920’s has improved our knowledge of the output mix of farms of different sizes, 
which makes it possible to answer some of the issues at stake in the contemporary debates on food tariffs 
before world War I. 
Since animal products were substantially less protected than bread-grain an intriguing question is 
whether agrarian protectionism in Sweden benefited only a minority of relatively large landowners 
specializing in bread-grain production, as Gerschenkron claimed was the case for Germany in the same 
period. The purpose of this paper is to explore the income distributional consequences of agrarian tariffs 
in Sweden before World War I. Did they benefit only a minority of relatively large landowners specializing 
in bread-grain production, or did the majority of small farmers also profit from them, and how did they 
affect real wages of urban workers and the rate of return on capital in the manufacturing industry? In the 
next section I outline some of the main features of agricultural development in Sweden in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thereafter, I show how arable and animal produce was 
distributed between farms of different sizes on the eve of World War I, and I also present data on the 
varying extent to which these farms benefited from agrarian protectionism. In the final section of the 
paper I explore the impact of agrarian tariffs by means of a Computable General Equilibrium model, 
calibrated with data from 1913.  
                                                 
5 Ibid., pp. 191–212. 
6  The Social Democrats demanded that a public investigation committee was set up to explore the effects of tariffs, 
ibid., pp. 202–203. In addition, an internal party committee had been appointed to improve factual knowledge on 
the issue and draw up the party’s policy. Nothing seems to have come out of it, Gellerman, Staten och jordbruket, 
pp. 191–192.  
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2. Swedish agriculture in 1870–1913, bread-grain protection and increasing specialization in 
animal produce 
The perhaps most visible sign that the world economy had entered an era of globalization in the late 
nineteenth century was the emergence of an international grain market that determined grain prices in 
each corner of the world. Falling transport costs and free trade led to sharply falling grain prices from the 
middle of the 1870’s. In Sweden, as in other countries on the European continent, this led to falling 
profitability for farmers and a drop in land prices.  
To stem the competition from overseas grain, landowners campaigned for the reintroduction of grain 
tariffs. In 1888 the protectionists won the majority in the Swedish parliament and tariffs on bread-grain 
and flour were introduced as well as tariffs on animal food products.7 The tariff on barley, rye and wheat 
was set to 2.5kr per 100 kilo, while oats was protected by 1 kr per 100 kilo. When international grain 
prices rose in the beginning of the 1890’s, tariffs on barley, rye and wheat were lowered to 1.25 kr per kilo 
in 1892, while the tariff on oats was abolished. Thereafter world market prices fell again. To protect 
Swedish producers the tariff on barley, rye and wheat was raised to 3.70 kr in 1896, and stayed unchanged 
thereafter. For barley and rye, the specific tariff on bread-grain translated into an ad valorem protection of 
30–35 percent for most years, while the protection for wheat was somewhat lower due to its higher price. 
Tariffs on flour were introduced concomitantly with grain tariffs. In 1888, a tariff of 4.30 kr per 100 kilo 
was imposed on flour. It was lowered to 2.50 kr per 100 kilo in 1892 and raised to 6.50 kr per kilo in 1896, 
which amounted to an ad valorem tariff of 40–45 percent for most years.  
The impact of the bread-grain tariff on Swedish grain prices can be seen from Figure 1 and Figure 2, 
showing the evolution of world market prices and domestic prices for rye and wheat, and the extent to 
which the tariff drove a wedge between world market prices and domestic prices. Swedish producers more 
or less entirely utilized the tariff on wheat (Figure 2), whilst for rye the price gap between Swedish and 
world market prices did not make up the whole tariff (Figure 1). Especially when world market prices 
rose, as they did between 1905 and 1910, the gap between Swedish and world market prices in rye 
diminished.  
The grain tariff thus succeeded in at least partially insulating Swedish grain prices from world market 
prices. After 1888, export of Swedish bread-grain virtually ended, since producers profited more by selling 
in the protected home market. For rye, the grain tariff also led to a decline in the share of imports in the 
home market. The import penetration ratio in rye declined from over 20 percent in the early 1880’s to 12 
percent in 1911/13 (Table 1). Demand for wheat was more income elastic than for rye, but Swedish 
climate and soil quality was generally less suited for growing wheat. Only on the plains of Scania and mid-
eastern Sweden were it profitable to grow wheat to any extent, despite the fact that tariffs made it possible 
for Swedish wheat producers to obtain prices which were 25–30 percent above world market prices. 
Consequently, the import penetration ratio in wheat increased from 30–35 percent in the 1880’s to about 
                                                 
7 Bohlin, ”Tariff Protection”. 
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60 percent around the turn of the century. Thereafter, Swedish producers were able to increase their 
market share to about 50 percent of the domestic market on the eve of WW I (Table 1).  
Animal produce also received protection. Tariffs on livestock were low and quite inconsequential, 
however, since transport costs and quarantine rules made for low trade volumes anyhow. More important 
was the tariff on pork of 0.20 kr per kilo, amounting to an ad valorem tariff of about 20 percent. The 
most important animal product, milk, was free of duty. It may be argued that milk producers enjoyed 
protection since the dairies, a major market for milk producers, were protected by a specific tariff on 
butter and margarine of 0.20 kr per kilo, translating into an ad valorem tariff protection of about 15 
percent for dairy products.8 However the butter tariff was largely inconsequential, since the Swedish butter 
price was more or less the same as the world market price9 as may be seen from Figure 3 where prices on 
Swedish and Danish butter of similar quality are compared.10  
Bread-grain tariffs may have caused an increase in cereal acreage in Sweden, in contrast to Britain and 
Denmark, who adhered to free trade.11 That tariffs influenced farmers’ choice of output mix can be seen 
clearly if we compare regions in Scania in southern Sweden with regions in neighbouring Denmark with 
similar climate and soil quality. In Scania, wheat growing expanded after the imposition of grain tariffs 
while it declined in the Danish regions. By contrast, fodder grain output and animal produce increased 
more in the Danish regions than in Scania.12 However, the most salient feature of Swedish land use in the 
late nineteenth century is not that the area devoted to bread grain production increased, but the much 
stronger increase in cultivated land used for growing fodder grains and green fodder of various sorts. 
Reclaimed land and land converted from meadows to arable was primarily used to produce fodder for the 
animals. These tendencies are clearly visible from Table 2. The bread-grain acreage increased by 11 
percent between 1880 and 1910. At the same time, the acreage devoted to the growing of oats, which was 
primarily used as fodder, increased by 28 percent, and the fodder grain acreage increased by 62 percent. 
The area occupied by meadows declined by 33 percent between 1880 and 1910.13  
To sum up, the percentage of the total cultivated acreage devoted to animal fodder increased from 53 
to 64 percent between 1885 and 1913, while at the same time the bread-grain acreage declined from 15.3 
to 13.7 percent. Swedish agricultural statistics on cultivated land has been accused of overstating the 
increase in the cultivated acreage in the late nineteenth century.14 However, in 1910 and probably also in 
the 1890’s it should be fairly accurate. It is also agreed that the percentage distribution of land between 
different crops is more accurate than the estimate of the total cultivated acreage. The trend in land use is 
anyhow unmistakable, and corrected numbers of the cultivated area would most likely show an even 
slower growth in the area devoted to bread-grain.  
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Jörberg, History of Prices in Sweden, II, p. 211. 
10 Denmark was the leading exporter of butter at the time; see Henriksen and O’Rourke, ”Incentives, Technology”. 
11 O’Rourke, ”European Grain Invasion”, table 4. 
12 Höijer,  Jämförelse. 
13 Höijer, Tabeller. 
14 Holgersson, ”Cultivated Land in Sweden”. 
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The change in the distribution of land use towards more fodder grains must bee seen against the 
background of an ongoing transformation of Swedish agriculture in the direction of more animal produce. 
While the volume of arable produce stagnated or even declined after 1870, the volume of animal produce 
increased by 2.3 percent per year between 1870 and 1913, as is visible from Figure 4. Prices for animal 
products did not nearly decline as much as did arable products from the 1870’s to the 1890’s (Figure 5). 
When prices on arable products increased in the 1890’s the prices of animal produce followed suit. Of 
even more importance than prices for the increasing specialization in animal produce was the fact that the 
income elasticity of demand for animal products was much higher than for arable products. In addition, 
milk, the major product of Swedish animal husbandry, also benefited from increased export demand, since 
it was indirectly exported in the form of butter. Butter was a major export article at the time.15 Its share of 
total Swedish exports was 10–13 percent at its height in the 1890’s, but after the turn of the century butter 
exports stagnated and its relative share of Swedish exports sank to about 5–7 percent.16  
3. Output mix and effective protection for farms of different sizes 
3.1. Distribution of land and output mix among farms of different sizes  
Data collected in the 1910’s and the early 1920’s have improved our knowledge of the output mix of 
farms of different sizes, which makes it possible to answer some of the issues at stake in the contemporary 
debates on food tariffs before world War I. From a special investigation from 1919 we have information 
on the distribution of cultivated land on farms of different sizes, measured by cultivated acreage. We also 
have information on the number of animals of various sorts on these farms. From these data it is possible 
to obtain estimates of the output of arable and animal products on farms of different sizes in 1913.17  
Table 3 reveals that the distribution of land among farms was unequal. The majority of farms 
cultivated an acreage that was smaller than five hectares. Of all farms 77 percent were smaller than ten 
hectares. They cultivated about one third of the total acreage. Measured in cultivated acreage, only 2 
percent of the farms were larger than 50 hectares, but they cultivated about 20 percent of the total acreage.  
The output mix of arable and animal products of various sorts among farms of different sizes is shown 
in Table 4. Small farms (up to ten hectares) were clearly specialized in animal produce. Arable output on 
these farms was largely complementary to animal output, since it consisted predominantly of oats which 
was mainly used to feed the animals. Production of bread-grain was of marginal importance on small 
farms. In contrast, for the larger farms cultivating land of more than 30 hectares, bread-grain production 
was of much larger importance. If we disregard oats, bread-grain accounted for about 40 percent of total 
output on farms with an acreage of over 30 hectares.  
The different roles of arable and animal products on farms of varying sizes also emerge clearly from 
Table 5, showing how much of total output of various products that was supplied by farms of different 
sizes. Production of bread-grain was largely concentrated to large farms. Small farms (below ten hectares), 
                                                 
15 Staffansson, Svenskt smör, p. 99 ff. 
16 My own estimates from Swedish foreign trade statistics. 
17 For an account of sources and estimation techniques, see Appendix 1. 
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on the other hand, accounted for a sizable share, almost 50 percent, of milk output. In contrast, of total 
bread-grain output small farms produced less than a third. If we consider only wheat farming, small farms 
were of even less importance; of total wheat output they only produced about 10 percent.  
The much more important role for bread-grain production on large farms is also confirmed by Ernst 
Höijer in a report commissioned by the public investigation committee on the tariff system, appointed 
after World War I.18 Höijer explored to what extent farms of different sizes were able to produce enough 
bread-grain to provide for the consumption by family members and hired farm-hands between 1913 and 
1919. He calculated that people occupied at farms of sizes up to 5 hectares were dependent on purchasing 
bread-grain to cover their deficits, while farms of sizes between 5 and 10 hectares barely covered their 
consumption from their own production. Only large farms, of sizes over 30 hectares, produced sizable 
marketable surpluses of bread-grain. According to Höijer’s estimate, more than half of the countryside 
population was dependent on purchase from larger farms for their consumption of bread-grain.  
3.2. Effective protection for farms of different sizes 
We have seen that the rate of protection varied considerably between different agricultural products. Since 
farms of different sizes specialized in different kinds of products they did not benefit to the same degree 
from the protectionist system. Of concern for the farmers was not only the tariff protection they received 
on their own produce but also to what extent their costs increased because of tariffs that they might have 
to pay on purchased inputs. If tariffs increased their revenues by a higher percentage than their purchased 
inputs they gained from the protectionist system. The rate of effective protection gauges by how much 
value added increases compared to a hypothetical situation of free trade.19 In calculating effective 
protection rates I have assumed that fertilizers were the only purchased inputs in arable production and 
concentrated fodder of various sorts, such as oats and oil-seed cakes, were the only purchased inputs in 
animal production. My estimates of nominal and effective tariff protection for various agricultural 
products are displayed in Table 6 and Table 7.  
Since the share of costs for purchased fertilizers in the sales value of grains only amounted to 5–10 
percent and the tariff rate on fertilizer was quite low (4–5 percent) the difference between the nominal and 
the effective protection rate was not large for grains. In animal produce it was only the production of hogs 
that was protected to a substantial extent, but the maize tariff also made the feeding of hogs more 
expensive. In 1901/06 the maize tariff of 1.25 kr per 100 kilo amounted to an ad valorem tariff of 11–13 
percent. When in 1906 the tariff on maize, the prize of which had declined relatively to oats, was raised to 
3.7 kr per 100 kilo the effective protection of hogs production was sharply reduced and hogs output fell, 
leading to increased import penetration of pork. In 1908 the maize tariff was reduced to 1.5 kr per 100 
kilo, after which it was abolished in 1911. The dismantling of the maize tariff in 1911 stimulated Swedish 
                                                 
18 Höijer, Utredning. 
19 See for example Corden, Theory of Protection. 
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pig farming. Import penetration of pork fell and Swedish producers captured a larger share of the home 
market.  
To sum up, Table 7 shows clearly that with the notable exception of pig farming animal produce was 
considerably less protected than arable produce. By putting together information gathered in Table 6, 
Table 7, and Table 5 we may calculate the rate of protection for farms in different size classes in 1911/14. 
The results from such a calculation are displayed in Table 8.20  
Since in Sweden the share of unprotected goods, such as oats and milk, was much more important in 
the output mix of small farms than of large farms we may conclude that the majority of small farmers 
benefited to a much smaller degree than large farmers from agricultural protectionism. The data presented 
so far explain why owners of large estates were the most ardent supporters of agrarian protectionism. 
Large landowners also succeeded in rallying support for tariffs from small farmers, as owners of small 
farms would also lose revenues from a withdrawal of tariffs, although not to the same extent as large 
farmers. However, counterfactual speculations of this sort do not take into account that the level of 
output and the output mix would hardly have stayed unchanged after a tariff reform. As a result of tariff 
changes prices would have changed, not only agricultural and food prices but all prices, not the least factor 
prices. Changes in relative prices would in their turn have affected resource allocation, which would have 
affected product prices and so forth. These issues will be explored in a general equilibrium framework in 
the following sections.  
4. A Computable General Equilibrium model of the Swedish economy in 1913 
The general idea behind a Computable Equilibrium Model (CGE model) is the interdependence of an 
economic system. Changes in one market will have repercussions on all markets. It is assumed that every 
market clears. The economy is supposed to be populated by rational agents that maximize or minimize 
objective functions subject to restraints. Consumers maximize utility functions subject to the restraints of 
their income while entrepreneurs minimize cost functions subject to the technology and inputs at their 
disposal.  
A CGE model has four types of exogenous variables: endowments, technology, consumer preferences, 
and policy variables such as taxes of various sorts. An economy’s factor endowments and technology 
determine its production possibility frontier. The technology of a sector, expressed by a production 
function, specifies how inputs may be combined to produce output. Cost functions derived from 
production functions generate demand functions for the factors. Factors are owned by agents who receive 
income from their ownership. These incomes are used to buy goods. In choosing between goods, 
consumers are guided by their preferences. Consumer preferences are modelled by utility functions which 
                                                 
20 Apparently, the effective protection for agriculture in Sweden was much lower than in Germany at the same time. 
This is primarily explained by the fact that in contrast to Germany oats and milk were not protected in Sweden. 
This also explains another contrast between Sweden and Germany, namely that in Sweden small farms received 
much less benefits from agricultural protectionism than large farms did while in Germany the gains from 
protection were quite equally spread among farms according to Webb. See Webb, ”Agricultural Protection”, table 
4. 
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specify how consumers combine inputs of various commodities, subject to the restraint of their incomes, 
to “produce” utility. From these utility functions final demand functions for the various good are derived.  
To be usable for analyzing real problems the abstract CGE model must be calibrated with data for a 
real economy in a benchmark year, in which the economy is assumed to be in a state of general 
equilibrium. For example, in order to explore the consequences of a particular trade policy reform the 
model economy is shocked by altering tariff rates. To find a new general equilibrium the economy will 
then have to adjust by altering relative prices. As a consequence factors of production will be reshuffled 
between the sectors and output levels of the various sectors will change.  
It is important to realize the limitations of this type of analysis. In a CGE model relative price changes 
bring forth a new equilibrium and a reshuffling of factors of production among sectors. Arguably, the 
possibility to reallocate factors of production is limited in the short run. Once installed in an industry a 
given piece of capital equipment is specific for that line of activity and can hardly move to another 
industry. Moreover, the economy is not simply “endowed” with capital and labour. Capital is accumulated 
and labour migrates in response to perceived economic opportunities. More important than a reallocation 
of existing resources at a point in time is how the present, for example a “shock” such as a tariff reform 
package, influences capitalists decisions to invest or disinvest and workers decisions to migrate or not, and 
thereby also the long-run evolution of “factor endowments”.  
A way to accommodate such long-run effects is to simulate a sequence of equilibria through time. In 
the period between the different equilibria endowments and possibly other exogenous variables are 
updated and then a new general equilibrium is solved and so on.21 However, more common seems to be 
to use CGE models in comparative static explorations. The idea is that by endowing the economy with 
more or less of a factor or by changing policy variables such as taxes, while leaving everything else the 
same, it is possible to counterfactually sort out the importance of the particular factor or tax rate. In these 
counterfactual scenarios it is typically assumed that “capital” is malleable, that it can be reshuffled between 
the sectors, or else it is equally strongly assumed that had the economy developed under different factor 
endowments or taxes the composition of physical capital might have been different than in the actual 
economy and fully appropriate to the structure of demand in the counterfactual economy, while 
everything else remains the same.22  
4.1. Description of the model 
The empirical backbone of the model is a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of the Swedish economy in 
1913, exhibited in Appendix 2 (Table 1, Table 2 and Table 6). The model has been constructed primarily 
to analyze trade policy issues. For this purpose I have divided the economy between the following sectors: 
Export industry (EXP_IND)23, Capital goods industry (CAP_IND), Consumer goods industry 
                                                 
21 See for example the classic work by Adelman and Robinson, Income distribution policy. 
22 See for example O’Rourke and Williamson, ”Open Economy Forces”. 
23 In this sector the classical Swedish export industries are included: Iron Ore Mines, Saw Mills, the Paper industry, 
Pulp mills, and also the Stone quarrying industry. These industries were generally unprotected. The paper industry 
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(CONS_IND), Forestry (FORESTRY), Building and construction (CONSTRUCT), Private services 
(including housing, and transports and communications) (SERVICES), Public services (PUBLICSERV). 
To explore the impact of agrarian tariffs I have subdivided the agricultural sector into three sectors: a 
bread-grain sector (AGRI_BREAD)24, a sector producing other arable products (AGRI_VEGE) and a 
sector producing animal products (AGRI_ANIM)25. For the same purpose I have also subdivided the 
food industry into two sectors: a sector producing animal food products (FOOD_ANIM)26 and another 
sector using bread-grain, vegetables and other arable products as inputs (FOOD_VEGE). In addition, 
two sectors of non-competitive imports have been included in the model to account for goods consumed 
but not produced in Sweden, namely non-competing capital goods and raw materials (RAWMAT)27, and 
non-competing agricultural goods (NC_AGRIC)28.  
Each sector uses intermediate goods in fixed proportions to value added, that is the elasticity of 
substitution between intermediate goods and the value added aggregate is zero (the Leontieff technology 
assumption). Capital and labour in combination produces value added. As is customary in CGE models, it 
is assumed that the “technology” can be described by a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
production function. Once an investment has been made and a capital good is put into place it is 
considered specific for that sector. In other words, the rate of return on “capital” varies between sectors.  
In the literature on CGE models it is common to distinguish between land and capital as two separate 
factors.29 Thus, it is often claimed that agriculture produces its output using land, labor and capital in 
cooperation. I do not follow this practice. In my model there is no separate factor land apart from capital 
in the agricultural sectors and for clarity it is worthwhile to make a digression to explain why. The 
distinction between the three factors land, labour and capital has its root in classical economics. The 
ground for making a separation between land and capital is that capital is a produced factor, a result of a 
previous history of accumulation, while land is given by Mother Nature. Land is therefore “scarce” in an 
absolute sense and cannot be augmented by accumulation. The scarcity of land also gives rise to rent as a 
separate economic category. The classical theory of land rent is at heart a theory of differential rent. A 
piece of land of superior quality yields higher output than land of lower quality of the same size, because it 
is unique. It therefore also yields higher rent or can be sold at a higher price than a piece of land of 
inferior quality. If all land were of the same quality there would be no basis for rent as a separate 
                                                                                                                                                        
was protected, but since it was a major export industry, tariffs were inconsequential for a large part of this 
industry.  
24 Barley, rye, wheat, sugar beets, beans, peas and horticultural products. 
25 This sector also includes fisheries. 
26 This sector includes Slaughter Houses and Dairies.  
27 Here I include products such as coal, coke based pig iron and other bulky steel products, which were hardly 
produced in Sweden, certain chemical raw materials but also consumer goods raw materials such as fur and hides, 
cotton, wool. The distinction between what should be counted as non-competitive and competitive is to a certain 
extent arbitrary. For example Sweden did produce wool and hides, but Swedish producers were fairly marginal as 
suppliers of these raw materials. All products in this sector were free from tariffs. 
28 The most important non-competing agricultural goods were coffee beans and tobacco. Other products were for 
example citrus fruits. Fiscal tariffs were imposed on products in this sector. Again, the distinction between what 
should be counted as non-competitive imports and as competitive imports is not clear-cut. For example, Sweden 
did produce raw tobacco in greenhouses. 
29 See for example, O’Rourke, ”European Grain Invasion”. 
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economic category. In addition, land is not simply given by nature. The value of land cannot be separated 
from the investments that have been made to make it usable, in land clearance, ditching etc. For the 
farmer the distinction between land and capital is uninteresting. He bought or inherited his farm in one 
piece. He does not know and does not care if his revenues emanate from his farm buildings, his 
equipment or his soil. The one is useless without the other in the same sense that a factory building is 
useless without the machines installed in it. What interests the farmer, however, is if his land yields more 
or less than other land worked with the same effort and equipment, but then we are back to the concept 
of differential rent. Since there is no differential rent in the model there is no place for “land” as a separate 
“factor” besides “capital” in the agricultural sectors.  
It can be shown that wage rates for labour of the same kind differ persistently between sectors. These 
differences may be caused by skill differences and institutional factors such as varying bargaining powers 
of capital and labour. To model the persistence of such “wage distortions” I have assumed that relative 
wages between sectors do not change for labour of the same kind. Shifts in the demand and supply curves 
affect the price of labour, but the wage structure for labour of the same kind stays intact.30  
Three sectors produced only for the home market and were insulated from competition by imports: 
the building and construction sector, the private services plus transport sector31, and the public services 
sector. Other sectors faced competition from the world market. I have assumed that Sweden was a “small 
country” as far as her imports were concerned. Accordingly, if domestically produced and imported goods 
were exactly alike, Swedish prices for goods facing import competition would be equal to world market 
prices plus the tariff rate. In that case the home market would be completely dominated by either home-
produced goods, if the tariff rate was high enough, or by imports. Economic statistics show that this does 
not happen; countries export and import the same types of goods. Arguably the statistics are too 
aggregated, but even with quite disaggregated statistics it has been shown that the phenomenon of “cross-
hauling” does not disappear. Therefore, in CGE modelling it is customary to apply the so called 
Armington assumption, according to which domestically produced goods and imported goods in a sector 
are separate goods that may be substituted for each other. The degree to which a price change calls forth a 
substitution between domestically produced goods and imported goods is determined by an elasticity of 
substitution.  
Industrial and agricultural goods were not sold directly to the final consumer. They were processed by 
the retail trade sector before final consumption. In line with Swedish Historical National Accounts32 I 
                                                 
30 This modelling device was introduced by Leif Johansen in his seminal Norway model, see Johansen, Multi-Sectoral 
Study. It has since been used in many applications. See for example Karlström, Economic Growth and Migration, 
Vikström, Big Picture. 
31 The private services and transport sector generated export incomes, but these resulted from commercial margins 
on commodity exports from other sectors and from shipping the export goods to foreign ports. The export 
income emanating from the services and transport sector should be viewed as an input to final exports. I have 
assumed that exports from other sectors are marked up by 26 percent by the SERVICES sector to arrive at final 
export values. This percentage corresponds quite well to the share of total export incomes generated by private 
services and transports according to Swedish Historical National Accounts. 
32 Krantz, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: Privata tjänster. 
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have assumed that those goods were marked up by the SERVICES sector by a given percentage on the 
sales value.33  
While it seems pertinent to regard Sweden as a price taker regarding her imports, the “small country” 
assumption is hardly fitting for Swedish exports. Sweden was a major exporter in for example iron ore, 
sawn timber, pulp and paper, so we cannot assume that Swedish exporters faced infinitely elastic demand 
curves for their exports. In each sector foreign demand for Swedish exports are expressed by export 
demand functions with sector specific export demand elasticities. It is assumed that the exporting sectors 
decided on whether to supply their products to the home market or to the export markets on the basis of 
relative prices in the two markets. A common device in CGE modelling, which is used also in this paper, 
is to assume that home market goods and export goods in a sector could be transformed to each other via 
a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function.  
Exports generate foreign exchange which is used to buy imports. If export incomes fall short of the 
value of imports there is an inflow of foreign savings. Capital inflow was an important feature of Swedish 
economic development from the 1870’s to World War I.34 Furthermore, the debts contracted in these 
decades resulted in contractual interest payments on the loans and accordingly an additional outflow of 
foreign exchange.35 It was only in the years immediately preceding World War I that the Swedish trade 
balance started to turn positive. Also important was that Swedish emigrants to the United States sent 
money home to their relatives. This inflow of foreign exchange was of some importance at the time and it 
is included in the calculation of foreign savings in the benchmark.36  
There are three income recipients in the model: a representative consumer, the government, and a 
fictitious agent called the investor. The representative consumer receives income in the form of factor 
rewards, net of income taxes. Part of the income is saved. It is assumed that a constant fraction of 
incomes is saved by the consumer. The remaining disposable income is used to buy goods. When income 
changes, it is highly unlikely that the pattern of consumption stays unchanged. In other words, the income 
elasticity of demand differs between various types of good. To allow for such effects I have modelled 
consumption by means of the Stone-Geary Linear Expenditure System (LES).37 In the LES, the 
consumption of a good consists of two parts. One part, which may be labelled the subsistence level of 
expenditure, stays the same irrespective of what happens to prices and/or income. The other part is 
proportional to the income that remains after the subsistence quantities have been bought and may also 
be viewed as the marginal propensity to consume a good. These marginal shares stay the same as income 
                                                 
33 I have assumed a margin of transport and trade services of 30.8 percent on final consumption goods in line with 
figures in the Historical National Accounts. 
34 Schön, ”Kapitalimport, kreditmarknad och industrialisering”. 
35 I have assumed that the rate of interest on the stock of foreign debt was 3 percent which was paid on a foreign 
debt of 2660 m kr in 1913. This results in a “negative endowment” of foreign exchange in the benchmark 
amounting to 79.8 m. kr. 
36 In 1913 emigrant remittances resulted in an inflow of 36 m. kr of foreign exchange. See Lindahl, Dahlgren, and 
Kock, National Income, Part Two, pp. 598–99, table 174. 
37 Stone, ”Linear expenditure systems”. 
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rise, so the LES may also be viewed as a Cobb-Douglas utility function displaced from the origin.38 In the 
model there is only one representative consumer, that is capitalists, workers and farmers are assumed to 
consume and save in exactly the same manner. That is obviously a gross oversimplification. If data had 
permitted it would have been preferable to have several separate income recipients, each with separate 
utility functions.  
The government receives income by collecting taxes39 and uses this income to demand the output of 
the public services sector. The government is the only consumer of the output of the public services 
sector (PUBLICSERV). The public services sector purchases few inputs from other sectors so the sales 
value of public sector output does not change much in the various simulations; it would only change as a 
result of changing wages for public sector employees. If the government’s income is larger than its outlay, 
which was the case in 1913 according to the benchmark SAM, the difference is saved. I have assumed that 
the level of government expenditures is exogenously given.  
Tariffs were an important source of revenue for the government. In 1913 tariffs accounted for 22 
percent of total taxes.40 Of these grain and food tariffs (excluding so called fiscal tariffs) made up roughly 
25 percent.41 Consequently, as a result of abolishing agricultural and food tariffs the government budget 
would turn from surplus to deficit. I assume as part of a tariff reform package that income taxes would 
rise endogenously to cover the eventual deficit resulting from diminishing tariff revenues.  
The investor collects the savings of the representative consumer and the government. In addition, this 
agent also receives any capital inflow from the rest of the world and services foreign debt incurred in 
earlier periods. The investor uses the savings he commands over to demand investment goods. There are 
no inventories in the model and hence no inventory investments. It is assumed that the volume of 
investment in fixed capital (machinery, equipment and buildings) is fixed, conceivably because it was 
ordered in a previous period. Foreign savings adapt to ensure that total savings will always equal 
investments.  
A CGE model solves for relative prices, one commodity must be assigned the role of a numeraire. For 
this purpose I use the price of foreign exchange, the real exchange rate, which is set to unity. The model 
has been implemented and solved using the GAMS/MPSGE software.  
                                                 
38 The baseline consumption levels of the various goods in the model are given in Table 3 in Appendix 2. 
39 The tax system at the time was a complicated mixture of taxes of various sorts. For simplicity I assume that all 
factor owners pay an income tax amounting to 4.7 percent of their income. This rate conforms fairly well to total 
state and municipal income taxes in 1913, see Gårestad, Industrialisering och beskattning, table 1. It would have been 
preferable to make a distinction between income taxes on wages and other factor incomes. The income tax rate 
for workers was lower than for other income categories and some workers with low income paid no income taxes 
at all. Another important source of revenues for the government was indirect taxes. Sales taxes were levied on 
liquor, sugar and beer, ibid., table 3. I assume that the FOOD_VEGE sector paid 5 percent of sales revenues in 
sales tax. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Calculations from foreign trade statistics.  
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5. What would have happened if agrarian tariffs had been removed? Counterfactual simulations  
5.1. Preliminary remarks on data 
To better interpret the counterfactual scenarios reported in this section it is useful to first make a few 
remarks about the data and elasticities used in the model. The input-output table of the Swedish economy 
in 1913 (Appendix 2, Table 6) and the final demand table (Appendix 2, Table1) clearly shows that the 
main outlet for the products of the agricultural sector was the food industry; the AGRI_BREAD sector 
provided the FOOD_VEGE sector with inputs and the AGRI_ANIM sector supplied the 
FOOD_ANIM sector. The forward linkages from the agricultural sectors to other sectors were of little 
importance. As a consequence the other sectors would be little affected by a withdrawal of agrarian and 
food tariffs, except through changes in wages and labour availability. It should also be noted that the 
AGRI_VEGE sector is essentially an adjunct to the AGRI_ANIM sector. Most of its output was 
delivered to the AGRI_ANIM sector and the two sectors might as well have been aggregated to one 
sector.  
A special problem in calibrating the model is the choice of elasticities. There is admittedly not much 
empirical basis for deciding on the various elasticities that are used in the model. There seems to be three 
approaches in the literature: own econometric estimates, use of estimates obtained from other studies, and 
more or less educated guess work.  
There is a large econometric literature on CES production functions. However, it has been shown that 
estimates of substitution elasticities are much dependent on the chosen specification.42 Karl G. Jungenfelt 
estimated that the elasticity of substitution in Swedish manufacturing was 0.6, by running a time series 
regression on data for Swedish manufacturing in the period 1870–1950 with the natural logarithm of 
labour productivity as the dependent variable and the natural logarithm of real wages as the independent 
variable.43 If we replace the data that were available to Jungenfelt by Lennart Schön’s more recent data on 
value added in Swedish manufacturing44 the estimated elasticity of substitution does not differ much from 
unity. Be that as it may, Jungenfelt’s estimate seems to have been accepted in other CGE-models for 
Sweden45 and an elasticity of substitution of about 0.5–0.6 for the manufacturing industry also appears to 
be standard in CGE modelling.46 I have therefore decided on an elasticity of substitution of 0.5 in the 
CES production functions for all but the agricultural sectors where the elasticity is set to unity, the 
argument being that if there is any activity where substitution between the factors of production is feasible 
to any extent it is within agriculture.  
There have also been many attempts to estimate Armington elasticities econometrically. A common 
specification seems to be to regress time series data on the natural logarithm of the ratio 
                                                 
42 Heathfield and Wibe, Introduction to Cost and Production Functions, ch. 9. 
43 Jungenfelt, Löneandelen. 
44 Schön, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: Industri. 
45 Karlström, Economic Growth and Migration, O’Rourke and Williamson, ”Open Economy Forces”, Vikström, Big 
Picture. 
46 See for example Federico and O’Rourke, ”Much ado about nothing”. 
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imports/domestic output for the home market against the natural logarithm of the ratio home 
price/import price.47 I have tried out the specification on many sectors of the Swedish economy for the 
period 1885–1913. In the few cases where I get coefficients that at least bear a resemblance to statistical 
significance, I nevertheless find them unreliable for my purposes. It has been shown that such estimates 
are very sensitive to the frequency of the data; high frequency data generally yields lower estimates than 
low frequency data. Lacking good price data, it makes sense to simply calculate the percentage change in 
the ratio imports/domestic output for the home market between two points in time and divide it with the 
percentage change in 1+tariff rate in the same period. However, another problem for counterfactual 
analysis is that the effect of a given percentage change in the tariff rate is hardly symmetrical with respect 
to the direction of the change. To give an example, between the late 1880’s and the First World War the 
import penetration ratio for bread-grain (rye and wheat) declined very little in Sweden, in response to the 
introduction of a tariff in the range of 25–35 percent. This would yield an elasticity of substitution not 
much above unity. However, it is reasonable to assume that the elasticity of the world supply curve facing 
Swedish grain consumers was much higher, so that the percentage change in the import penetration ratio 
would have been quite large as a result of a dismantling of bread-grain tariffs. With this argument, I have 
set the Armington elasticity to 10 for the bread-grain sector. It seems reasonable to assume that the 
Armington elasticity was lower for the food producing industry, since varying national tastes should have 
served to reduce the inflow of imported goods in response to a withdrawal of tariffs. I have therefore 
decided on an Armington elasticity of 5 in the FOOD_VEGE and the FOOD_ANIM sectors.  
The empirical basis for deciding on export price elasticities and CET transformation elasticities is even 
weaker than is the case for Armington elasticities and CES substitution elasticities. It is reasonable to 
assume that export price elasticities are considerably higher for primary goods and agricultural goods than 
is the case for industrial goods. The manufacturing industry produced differentiated goods and price was 
not the only argument in the competition for market shares. Furthermore, many Swedish export 
industries, such as saw mills and paper mills, were involved in international cartel agreements and they 
were not free to steel market shares by lowering prices. It seems to be standard practice in CGE models to 
set high numbers on CET transformation elasticities.48 I have followed this practice for agricultural goods.  
In the following three counterfactual simulations we look at what happens in the model when we 
remove all agricultural tariffs and the tariffs protecting the food industries. The sales tax on the output 
value of the FOOD_VEGE sector is also removed, but tariffs on NC_AGRIC imports are kept.  
5.2. Simulation 1, sector specific capital in all sectors, separate urban and rural labour markets  
In this simulation land and farm capital is specific to each sector of agricultural produce, that is land used 
for growing bread-grain cannot be used for pasture or for growing other arable products. The results from 
this simulation are reported in table 9. The most obvious effect is that prices fall steeply for bread-grain 
                                                 
47 See for example Irwin, ”Could the United States iron industry have survived free trade”. 
48 See for example Federico and O´Rourke, ”Much ado about nothing”. 
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producers. Import prices are reduced bye the whole amount of the tariff, 20 percent, resulting in a rise of 
import volumes by almost 50 percent. According to the assumptions in this simulation, land used for 
growing bread-grain has no other uses. In addition full utilization of all factors is assumed. Bread-grain 
output contracts since labour inputs are reduced. The revenues of bread-grain producers fall by 30 
percent, primarily as a result of falling bread-grain prices. As a result, the factor rewards for owners of 
bread-grain farms take a dive by more than 30 percent.  
The labour released from the bread-grain sector is employed in other agricultural sectors, leading to a 
slight increase in their output, which is sold at somewhat reduced prices, but on the whole, the 
AGRI_VEGE and the AGRI_ANIM sectors are little affected. 
The output of the animal food industry (FOOD_ANIM) increases slightly. The vegetable food 
industry (FOOD_VEGE), on the other hand, faces harder competition from imports. The import volume 
increases by 75 percent and sales prices in this sector fall by almost 15 percent, but the output volume 
remains quite unaffected.  
Post-tax nominal wages for rural workers decline by 7.2 percent. Because of increased imports of 
bread-grain the demand curve for labour shifts inwards in the agricultural sectors. Since full employment 
of rural labour is assumed the labour supply curve is infinitely inelastic and the inward shift of the labour 
demand curve leads to a commensurate decline in nominal wages. In the urban sectors, post-tax wages 
decline by 0.6 percent. However, both rural and urban labour benefit from lower prices on consumer 
goods which fall by 3.5 percent.49 Hence post-tax real wages for rural workers fall by 3.8 percent while 
they rise for urban workers by 2.8 percent. To prevent the government budget from falling into deficit as 
a result of declining tariff revenues income taxes are raised by 1.1 percentage units.50  
5.3. Simulation 2, sector specific capital in urban sectors, common factor “land” in agrarian sectors, separate urban and 
rural labour markets 
In this simulation, the results of which are reported in table 10, I drop the assumption that land used for 
growing bread-grain is confined to producing these crops. Surely the owners of this land could convert 
their wheat-fields and rye fields to pasture or to the growing of oats. To increase their stock of animals 
would take time and incur investment costs, but with a leap of faith we might perhaps envisage that their 
farm capital could somehow be effortlessly remoulded (less wheat fields, more pasture and livestock). Or 
else we might make the equally strong assumption that had there been no previous history of agrarian 
protectionism the same amount of capital might have been invested in the farms, only its composition 
would have been different. Thus, in the simulation reported in this section I assume that “land” can be 
used equally well for producing milk as for producing wheat or other crops, so that in all agricultural 
                                                 
49 In this and the following simulations the consumer price index refers to the consumption basket of the 
representative consumer. Since the consumption basket changes slightly in the counterfactuals I have used a 
Fisher index to calculate the index number. 
50 The tariff reform package makes the government surplus disappear; the compensatory income tax increase is just 
enough to balance the budget. As a consequence domestic savings decrease and the benchmark balance of 
payment surplus of 3 million kr is about halved. 
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sectors the primary factors are land and labour.51 I keep the assumption that there are two labour markets: 
one for rural and one for urban workers.  
We first look at what happens to gross output following a tariff reform. The most obvious change is 
that bread-grain output falls by 39 percent and prices by 10 percent. As a result sales revenues fall by more 
than 40 percent. It may seem odd that the prices obtained by domestic producers fall by only 10 percent 
when import prices fall by 20 percent. One explanation is of course that the goods produced by domestic 
producers were not identical to imported goods; for example, horticultural goods are included in bread-
grain output. However, the main reason for why consumers, according to the simulation, would be 
prepared to pay a price premium on home produced bread-grain is that the elasticity of substitution 
between home produced and foreign bread-grain is not modelled as infinite but assumed to be 10. In the 
real world it might have been higher. The reason behind the contraction in bread-grain output is of course 
increased competition from imports. According to the simulation the volume of bread-grain imports 
increases by 105 percent.  
The output of the vegetable food industry does not change much but sales prices decline by almost 15 
percent leading to a decline of sales revenues at approximately the same rate. Prices fall also in the animal 
food industry (by 10 percent) but output increases more (by 16.5 percent), leading to increased sales 
revenues.  
Following the tariff withdrawal, imports of vegetable food products (VEGE_FOOD) increases by 76 
percent. The percentage change in imports is large also in the other agricultural and food producing 
sectors. However, the initial import levels were quite low in these sectors (see Appendix 2, table 1), so a 
high percentage rate of change only generates small level changes.  
Exports from the agricultural and food producing sectors are affected by a tariff reform, but among 
these sectors only the animal food industry (FOOD_ANIM) had any sizable export from the beginning. 
Thus the 29 percent increase in the export volume of the ANIM_FOOD sector generates more export 
income than the combined increase in exports of the other sectors.  
Of particular importance is how a withdrawal of food tariffs would have affected factor prices. 
According to the simulation, bread-grain landowners, pressed by competition from imports, switch over 
to other crops (AGRI_VEGE) and to animal produce (AGRI_ANIM), which raises output in these 
sectors. In order for the increased output to be absorbed by the market, prices would have to fall at 
approximately the same rate, leaving nominal output only slightly changed. All in all, the rewards to 
landownership fall by 15.9 as a result of the tariff reform.  
Rural wages net of income taxes52 decline by 10.8 percent while urban wages stay largely unaffected. 
Of interest for workers would have been not only how money wages developed. Above all, they would 
                                                 
51 I have also tried out a simulation where animal output is produced by land, labour and capital specific to this 
sector (animal stock and equipment). To calibrate the benchmark data, I apportioned farm profits in the animal 
producing sector between “land” and the animal stock under the assumption that those “factors” received the 
same rate of return per invested kr. The results of this simulation was very similar to the one reported in this 
section. The factor rewards paid to land owners fall by roughly the same percentage rate and the factor rewards 
for owning the animal stock stay unaffected. 
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have been interested in what they could buy for their wages. The consumer price index declines by 4.6 
percent, so that post-tax real wages in the urban sectors rise by 4.0 percent, while those of rural workers 
decline by 6.3 percent.  
The factor rewards to owners of capital in non food producing urban sectors are little affected. The 
only partial exception to this is the export industry, since its most important input, emanating from the 
forestry sector, falls in price, because of the fall in rural wages. The reward to capital owners in the animal 
food industry rises by a staggering 40 percent while it declines slightly (by 5 percent) in the 
FOOD_VEGE sector. Value added shares were low in the food producing industries, particularly in the 
animal food industry, hence falling input prices weigh much heavier in their costs than the rise in urban 
wages.  
5.4. Simulation 3, sector specific capital in urban sectors, common factor “land” in agrarian sectors, one labour market  
In this simulation I release the assumption of separate labour markets for urban and rural workers and 
assume instead that labour could move freely between the urban and rural sectors. This is the only change 
compared to simulation 2. I still maintain the assumption that there were persistent wage differences 
between the various sectors caused by a “wage distortion” factor. The results of the simulation are 
reported in table 11.  
When allowing for labour mobility between the urban and rural sectors, nominal post-tax wages fall by 
6.3 percent following a withdrawal of agricultural and food tariffs. Rural workers moving to the urban 
sectors put a downward pressure on wages and the income tax rate increases from 4.7 percent to 5.6 
percent to compensate for falling tariff revenues. In this simulation workers are not fully compensated by 
falling consumer prices. The consumer price index falls by 4.9 percent, lowering real post-tax wages by 1.4 
percent. Otherwise there is little difference between this and the previous simulation.  
6. Conclusions 
The invasion of cheap overseas grain in the 1880’s provoked the reintroduction of grain tariffs in Sweden 
as in many other countries on the European continent. Agrarian protectionism was filled with controversy 
from the beginning. Tariffs were high on bread-grain, while protection of animal product was low and 
largely inconsequential in a period when the majority of Swedish farmers changed their output mix 
towards more animal produce. In the paper the income distributional consequences of agrarian tariffs on 
the eve of World War I are explored by means of a Computable General Equilibrium model of the 
Swedish economy, calibrated with data from 1913. Counterfactual simulations with the model make 
possible a few general conclusions.  
Money wages of rural workers would generally fall as a result of removing agrarian tariffs. What would 
have happened to urban workers depends on the extent to which the rural and urban labour markets were 
integrated. If the two labour markets were insulated from each other, money wages of urban workers 
                                                                                                                                                        
52 The income tax rate increases by 1.2 percentage units, from 4.7 percent to 5.9 percent. 
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would be little affected and they would enjoy increasing real wages because of falling food prices. If the 
urban and rural labour market were integrated into one labour market, money wages would fall also for 
urban workers. In this simulation competition from rural workers migrating to the urban centra would put 
downward pressure on post-tax money wages to an extent that would not be fully compensated by falling 
consumer prices. Accordingly, real wages would slightly decline. Important for this result is also that the 
income tax would increase to compensate for falling tariff revenues. While the exact results of this 
simulation are obviously open to dispute they make clear that workers would not unequivocally gain from 
a withdrawal of agrarian and food tariffs. It seems reasonable to assume that there was no Chinese wall 
between the urban and the rural labour market. After all rural–urban migration were prevalent in the 
decades before WW I.53 The uncertain effect of a tariff reform package on workers living standards takes 
us a long way to understanding the hesitant opposition to agrarian protectionism of the workers 
movement on the eve of World War I.  
Capital owners in non-food urban industries would be little affected by a dismantling of agricultural 
and food tariffs. Since there were hardly any backward linkages from these industries to agriculture they 
would primarily be affected by changes in wages, tax payments and final demand for their products 
following a tariff reform. For most of these industries the most favourable of our simulations would be an 
integrated labour market when nominal wages would decline in urban industries54, but all in all the reward 
to capital owners in these industries would only be marginally affected. However, capital owners would 
benefit from lower consumer prices. Thus, even if their nominal incomes would change only slightly their 
buying power over consumer goods would increase. Arguably, this was of little concern to urban 
capitalists since most of their incomes were saved and only a small share was spent on basic food 
necessities.  
Of special interest for the issues in this paper is how capital owners in the food industries would be 
affected. The reward to capital owners in the animal food industry would increase considerably, since 
output would increase as a result of enlarged exports and input costs would decline. Their peers in the 
vegetable food industry would only loose slightly, despite sharply falling sales prices. Apparently, lower 
nominal wages and input prices compensated for falling output prices.  
Bread-grain producers would unequivocally lose a lot from a removal of agrarian tariffs. What would 
have happened to farmers specializing in animal produce depends on to what extent producers in the 
bread-grain sector were able to switch over to animal husbandry. In the real world it would obviously take 
time to convert farms from bread-grain to animal produce and costs would have to be incurred. If we 
simply disregard such transition costs and assume that farms could be converted from bread-grain to 
animal production immediately and effortlessly, output of animal products would expand at the expense 
of bread-grain. The reward to landownership would in this case fall by roughly 15 percent (simulation 2 
and 3). This figure should be interpreted as what the average landowner would lose from a dismantling of 
                                                 
53 See for example Thomas, Social and Economic Aspects. 
54 However, the export industry would benefit more in the case of separate urban and rural labour markets since it 
was heavily dependent on inputs from the forestry sector which would benefit from declining rural wages.  
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agrarian and food tariffs given the opportunity to switch over from bread-grain to animal produce. Small 
farmers would in general fare better since most of them already specialized in animal husbandry, but in 
none of the counterfactual scenarios do the factor rewards for animal producers rise. Also, even if small 
farms heavily specialized in animal produce they also produced some bread-grain. Moreover, small 
farmers were also dependent on wage income for their livelihood, whether on imputed wages for labour 
they performed on their own farms or wages for part-time labour on larger estates. The results of the 
counterfactual simulations underline what can be shown by effective protection rates, namely that small 
farmers gained from agrarian protectionism, although not to the same extent as large landowners.  
The paper illustrates a general theme in the literature on the political economy of tariffs. There was one 
group that clearly benefited from agrarian protectionism, namely landowners specializing in bread-grain 
production. The eventual benefit to other groups in society of a dismantling of agrarian protectionism was 
uncertain and less clear-cut. This also explains why agrarian protectionism, though controversial, showed 
great persistency once instituted.  
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TABLE 1. Import penetration ratio (%) of the domestic market for grain, 1881/85–1911/13. 
 Barley Oats Rye  Wheat 
1881/1885 4 0 23 34 
1886/1890 1 0 20 30 
1891/1895 2 0 15 49 
1896/1900 2 2 15 52 
1901/1905 1 6 16 59 
1906/1910 1 7 9 52 
1911/1913 0 7 12 46 
Sources: Lindahl, et al., National Income, Part Two, pp. 30–37, table 66. 
Note: The import penetration ratio is calculated as imports /(domestic output - exports + imports). 
 
TABLE 2. Distribution of total arable land in Sweden, 1880–1910 (1000 hectares) among different uses 
 Bread-grain1) Oats2) Fodder grain3) Fallow Total Arable 
land 
1880 448.5 742.2 831.0 424.2 2 917.5 
1885 446.9 832.6 936.1 405.3 3 079.2 
1890 460.9 906.3 1 029.4 410.6 3 271.0 
1895 474.7 947.3 1 106.7 420.9 3 423.7 
1900 489.0 954.6 1 190.2 413.9 3 519.9 
1905 493.6 963.0 1 264.4 402.0 3 592.6 
1910 499.1 953.7 1 349.0 362.6 3 644.9 
Source: Höijer, Tabeller, pp. 18–20 table 14a. 
Notes: 1) Rye and wheat 
2) Oats and dredge (a mixture of oats and rye, which was used for animal fodder). 
3) Cultivated crops used for producing hay and for grazing. 
 
TABLE 3. Distribution of farms on various size classes (hectares) and the cultivated acreage per size class, 
Sweden 1919 
Size classes of 
farms 
(hectares) 
Number of 
farms 
Percentage 
of total 
number of 
farms 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Hectares Percentage 
of total 
cultivated 
acreage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Average farm 
size (hectares) 
0.26–1 56 232 13 13 38 147 1 1 0.678 
>1–2 64 556 15 28 100 990 3 4 1.564 
>2–5 115 947 27 55 401 493 10 14 3.463 
>5–10 92 857 50 77 679 914 18 32 7.322 
>10–20 61 707 14 91 872 102 23 55 14.133 
>20–30 18 069 4 95 443 165 12 67 24.526 
>30–50 11 459 3 98 438 709 12 79 38.285 
>50–100 5 355 1 99 365 820 9 88 68.314 
> 100 2 576 1 100 441 484 12 100 171.384 
Sum 428 758   3 781 824   8.820 
Source: Höijer, Tabeller, pp. 62–65, table 14. 
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TABLE 4. Percentage distribution of output (%) on farms of different sizes 
Size classes 
of farms 
(hectares) 
Bread-
grain 1) 
Other 
vegetables 
2)  
Total 
arable 
produce 
Slaughter 
animals 
3) 
Pigs Milk Poultry 4) Total 
animal 
produce 
0–1 4 17 21 11 11 47 10 79 
>1–2 6 17 23 12 9 49 7 77 
>2–5 8 20 28 14 9 44 5 72 
>5–10 11 24 35 14 10 38 4 65 
>10–20 16 27 43 12 10 31 3 57 
>20–30 23 28 51 11 10 27 2 49 
>30–50 26 28 54 10 9 25 2 46 
>50–100 27 29 56 10 8 25 1 44 
>100 30 29 59 10 7 24 1 41 
All Farms 18 26 43 11 9 33 3 57 
Sources: See Appendix 1. 
Notes: 1) Barley, wheat, rye and other crops protected by tariffs, i.e. sugar-beets, peas and beans. 
2) Oats, dredge (a mixture of rye and oats used for feeding animals) and potatoes. These crops were not 
protected by tariffs. 
3) Horses, cattle, sheep and goats 
4) Hens for slaughter, chickens and eggs. 
 
 
TABLE 5. Distribution of agricultural output (%) on farms of different sizes 
Size 
classes of 
farms 
(hectares) 
Bread-
grain 1) 
Other 
vegetables 
2)  
Total 
arable 
produce 
Slaughter 
animals 3)
Pigs Milk Poultry 
4) 
Total 
animal 
produce
0–1 1 2 1 3 3 7 3 3 
>1–2 1 3 2 5 4 10 7 6 
>2–5 6 11 9 17 13 19 18 17 
>5–10 12 18 15 24 20 21 21 22 
>10–20 21 23 22 24 25 22 21 22 
>20–30 14 12 13 11 11 8 9 9 
>30–50 16 11 13 10 10 6 8 8 
>50–100 12 9  10 8 7 4 6 6 
>100 17 12 14 9 7 3 7 7 
All 
Farms 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sources: See Appendix 1. 
Notes: See Table 4. 
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TABLE 6. Nominal and effective protection for arable products (%), 1901/05–1911/14 
Nominal tariffs 
 Rye Wheat Barley Oats Beans/Peas Sugar beats Potatoes 
1901/05 37.0 29.0 34.0 0.0 25.0 65.0 0.0 
1906/10 30.0 26.0 30.0 0.0 22.0 50.0 0.0 
1911/14 32.0 25.0 26.0 0.0 21.0 35.0 0.0 
Effective tariffs 
1901/05 38.0 30.9 34.9 -0.1 29.3 81.6 -0.5 
1906/10 30.7 27.4 30.7 -0.1 25.9 59.4 -0.5 
1911/14 32.7 26.3 26.5 -0.1 24.2 40.1 -0.5 
Sources: See Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7. Nominal and effective protection for animal products (%), 1901/05–1911/14 
 
Nominal tariffs 
 Live cattle Milk Poultry Eggs Hogs 
1901/05 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.0 
1906/10 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 
1911/14 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 
Effective tariffs 
1901/05 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.6 
1906/10 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.2 
1911/14 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 46.6 
Sources: See Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8. Average effective protection ( %), for farms of various sizes 1911/14. 
hectares Average effective protection 1911/14 
0– 4.4 
>1–2 4.5 
>2–5  5.4 
>5–10 6.7 
>10–20 8.3 
>20–30 10.0 
>30–50 11.0 
>50–100 10.7 
>100 11.2 
All Farms 8.4 
Note: The effective protection rate for each size class is a weighted average obtained by multiplying the 
product specific effective protection rate by its share of total value added in each size class. 
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TABLE 9.  Simulation 1, sector specific capital in all sectors, separate urban and rural labour markets. 
Percentage changes in output and prices 
  Output 
volume 
Price 
Output 
Output 
nomi- 
nal 
Import
volume 
Price 
imports 
Import
nomi- 
nal 
Exports
volume 
Price 
exports 
Exports
nomi-
nal 
Reward 
to 
Capital 
Nomi- 
nal 
wages 
Real 
wages 
EXP_IND 0.6 -0.8 -0.2 -1.3 0.0 -1.3 0.8 -0.4 0.4 1.9 — — 
CAP_IND -0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.9 0.0 -0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.9 — — 
CONS_IND -0.6 -0.2 -0.7 -1.5 0.0 -1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.9 — — 
FOOD_ANIM 5.7 -4.3 1.2 -4.9 -2.9 -7.6 10.7 -2.0 8.5 12.6 — — 
FOOD_VEGE -0.2 -13.9 -14.0 75.0 -23.1 34.6 37.4 -6.2 28.9 -1.4 — — 
AGRI_BREAD -17.3 -15.2 -29.9 48.1 -20.0 18.4 86.4 -6.0 75.2 -33.9 — — 
AGRI_VEGE 3.5 -3.0 0.4 -11.2 0.0 -11.2 8.2 -1.6 6.5 -1.4 — — 
AGRI_ANIM 3.2 -4.3 -1.2 -8.8 -2.0 -10.6 11.2 -2.1 8.9 -2.6 — — 
FORESTRY 0.8 -4.0 -3.2 -7.3 0.0 -7.3 3.8 -1.9 1.9 -4.4 — — 
CONSTRUCT 0.0 0.2 0.1 — — — — — — -0.6 — — 
SERVICES 0.4 0.1 0.5 — — — — — — -0.1 — — 
PUBLICSERV 0.0 0.1 0.1 — — — — — — -0.9 — — 
Labour, urban — — — — — — — — — — -0.6 2.8 
Labour, rural — — — — — — — — — — -7.2 -3.8 
  
 
  
TABLE 10. Simulation 2, sector specific capital in urban sectors, common factor “land” in agrarian 
sectors, separate urban and rural labour markets. Percentage changes in output and prices 
  Output 
volume 
Price 
Output 
Output 
nomi- 
nal 
Import
volume 
Price 
imports 
Import
nomi- 
nal 
Exports
volume 
Price 
exports 
Exports
nomi-
nal 
Reward 
to 
Capital 
Nomi- 
nal 
wages 
Real 
wages 
EXP_IND 0.9 -1.0 -0.1 -1.6 0.0 -1.6 1.1 -0.6 0.6 2.7 —  
CAP_IND -0.6 -0.5 -1.1 -1.8 0.0 -1.8 0.2 -0.1 0.1 -2.7 — — 
CONS_IND -0.7 -0.5 -1.3 -3.5 0.0 -3.5 1.0 -0.2 0.8 -2.4 — — 
FOOD_ANIM 16.5 -10.1 4.8 -27.2 -2.9 -29.3 29.4 -5.0 22.9 40.0 — — 
FOOD_VEGE -0.9 -13.6 -14.4 76.4 -23.1 35.7 36.5 -6.0 28.2 -4.9 — — 
AGRI_BREAD -38.7 -9.7 -44.7 104.7 -20.0 63.7 26.2 -2.3 23.3 — — — 
AGRI_VEGE 10.5 -9.8 -0.3 -34.2 0.0 -34.2 30.1 -5.1 23.5 — — — 
AGRI_ANIM 9.2 -10.2 -2.0 -30.3 -2.0 -31.6 30.7 -5.2 23.9 — — — 
FORESTRY 1.0 -4.8 -3.8 -8.7 0 -8.7 4.7 -2.3 2.3 -4.1 — — 
CONSTRUCT 0.0 0.1 0.0 — — — — — — -0.6 — — 
SERVICES 0.6 -0.3 0.3 — — — — — — -0.2 — — 
PUBLICSERV 0.0 0.0 0.0 — — — — — — -1.0 — — 
Land — — — — — — — — — 15.9 — — 
Labour, urban — — — — — — — — — — -0.5 4.0 
Labour, rural — — — — — — — — — — -10.8 -6.3 
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TABLE 11. Simulation 3, sector specific capital in urban sectors, common factor “land” in agrarian 
sectors, one labor market. Percentage changes in output and prices 
  Output 
volume 
Price 
Output 
Output 
nomi- 
nal 
Import 
volume 
Price 
imports 
Import
nomi- 
nal 
Exports
volume 
Price 
exports 
Exports
nomi-
nal 
Reward 
to 
Capital 
Nomi- 
nal 
wages 
Real 
wages 
EXP_IND 2.0 -1.3 0.7 -1.1 0.0 -1.1 2.3 -1.1 1.1 0.9 — — 
CAP_IND 1.9 -3.0 -1.2 -4.6 0.0 -4.6 3.9 -1.9 1.9 -1.0 — — 
CONS_IND 2.9 -2.5 0.4 -9.6 0.0 -9.6 8.2 -1.6 6.5 1.5 — — 
FOOD_ANIM 14.8 -8.9 4.6 -23.0 -2.9 -25.3 26.9 -4.6 21.0 27.4 — — 
FOOD_VEGE -0.2 -14.5 -14.6 69.0 -23.1 30.0 41.5 -6.7 32.0 -7.3 — — 
AGRI_BREAD -44.5 -8.1 -49.0 122.1 -20.0 77.7 14.5 -1.3 12.9 — — — 
AGRI_VEGE 8.6 -8.3 -0.4 -29.8 0.0 -29.8 26.2 -4.5 20.4 — — — 
AGRI_ANIM 7.3 -8.2 -1.5 -23.2 -2.0 -24.7 25.2 -4.4 19.7 — — — 
FORESTRY 1.2 0.8 2.0 2.9 0.0 2.9 0.4 -0.2 0.2 2.6 — — 
CONSTRUCT -0.1 -4.0 -4.1 — — — — — — -6.8 — — 
SERVICES 1.1 -1.9 -0.8 — — — — — — -0.6 — — 
PUBLICSERV 0.0 -4.8 -4.8 — — — — — — -6.8 — — 
Land — — — — — — — — — -15.7 — — 
Labour — — — — — — — — — — -6.3 -1.4 
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FIGURE 1. Rye, domestic price and Bremen export price 
Source: Åmark, Handels- och prisöversikter, pp. 118–26 
Note: Prices are yearly averages of monthly prices. Domestic prices are averages of prices in Stockholm 
and Malmö.  
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FIGURE 2. Wheat, domestic price and London, Gazette price 
Source: See Figure 1. 
Note: See Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 3. Swedish and Danish butter prices, 1895–1913 
Source: Danish butter prices Pedersen and Petersen, Analysis of Price Behaviour, pp. 246–47, Swedish home 
market prices Ljungberg, Priser och marknadskrafter, pp. 386-388, Swedish export prices, Bidrag till Sveriges 
Officiella Statistik. 
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FIGURE 4. Volume of animal and arable produce in Swedish agriculture 1870–1913 
Source: Unpublished data provided by Lennart Schön.  
Note: It should be noted that the volumes include only products for sales outside of the agricultural 
sector. For example, grains produced for seeds or animal fodder is not included in the volume of arable 
produce, and milk used for feeding animals is not included in the volume of animal produce.  
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FIGURE 5. Prices for animal products and arable products (1913=100)  
Source: Animal products and arable products, implicit price indices calculated from unpublished data 
provided by Lennart Schön. 
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Appendix 1. Sources and methods used for calculating farm output, labour use and effective 
protection rates at farms in different size classes 
Farm output 
For the year 1919 we have data on the number of farms and hectares cultivated by farmers in the 
following size classes: 0–0.25 hectares, >0.25–2 hectares, >2–5 hectares, >5–10 hectares, >10–20 
hectares, >20–30 hectares, >30–50 hectares, >50–100 hectares, >100 hectares.55. From the same source 
we also have information for the different size classes of farms on how large a share of the acreage that 
was used for fallow and for the growing of various crops. In addition, there is data for the same size 
classes of farms on output (harvest and seed) for wheat, rye, barley, oats, peas and beans.56 For other 
crops I have assumed that the output and seeds for each crop on each farm were the same per hectare as 
the national average. In order to calculate output for the various crops per classes of farm size I have 
assumed that their shares of output in 1913 as given in Swedish historical national accounts57 were the 
same as in 1919.  
From Historical National Income statistics we have estimates for each year on the number of animals 
(horses, bullocks, bulls, cows, young cattle and calves, sheep, goats, pigs and poultry).58 To estimate the 
number of animals for different farm sizes in 1913 I have assumed that the size distribution for the 
various animals was the same as in 1919. For the latter year we have information for each size-class of 
farms on the number of horses, cows, young cattle and calves, bullocks, bulls, pigs, goats, sheep and 
lambs.59 For poultry we lack information on the size distribution of the number of animals. Poultry was 
more common among small farmers. To make an educated guess on the distribution of hens among farms 
of different sizes, I have used information60 which gives data on the number of hens per size class in 27 
counties in southern and middle Sweden for the year 1917. To estimate the output of animal food 
products on the various farms sizes in 1913 I have simply assumed that their output per animal of meat, 
milk, eggs and so on was the same as the national average according to historical national accounts.61  
Labor use 
To calculate the labour input in the various parts of arable and animal husbandry I have used estimates of 
normal labour use in different agricultural activities provided by Ludvig Nanneson.62 Accordingly, it is 
                                                 
55 Höijer, Undersökning, table 17a. 
56 Höijer, Utredning, pp. 54–74, table 51. 
57 Lindahl, Dahlgren, and Kock, National Income, Part Two, pp. 30–48, table 66. 
58 Ibid., pp. 92–98, table 69. 
59 Höijer, Tabeller, pp. 102, table 123 a-b. 
60 Höijer, Undersökning, pp. table 1–2. 
61 Lindahl, Dahlgren, and Kock, National Income, Part Two, pp. 92–98, table 69, 111, table 173b, 117, table 174, 130–
131, table 175. 
62 See Nanneson, ”Kontroll”. For poultry farming I have made an educated guess on the basis of SOU1931:7, 
Betänkande that labour costs were 27.5 percent of gross output.  
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assumed that the work hours per hectare and animal in each line of production were the same for each 
farm size. To calculate labour costs the estimated work hours have been multiplied by 0.25 kr.63  
Calculations of effective protection rates  
In order to calculate effective tariffs we need data on nominal tariffs64 and cost shares for inputs. I have 
assumed that the only purchased input besides labour in arable production is fertilizer. I have made an 
educated guess on the cost shares of fertilizer from material presented by Nanneson.65 It is assumed that 
the use of fertilizer per hectare and crop was the same in each size class of farms.  
The only purchased input in animal production is concentrated fodder. Based on data given by 
Nanneson66 I assume that the cost share of concentrated fodder in the sales value of live cattle was 40 
percent in 1911/14. For hogs production I have assumed that the cost share of purchased inputs in the 
sales value of hogs was 70 percent in 1911/14 and that maize accounted for 85 percent of these inputs.  
I have assumed that fertilizer was the only purchased input in the production of grain and other 
vegetables.67  
Assuming the same physical input-output relationships for other years the cost shares of purchased 
inputs for 1901/05 and 1906/10 have been calculated on the basis of price data given by Jonas Ljungberg 
and Swedish foreign trade statistics.68  
 
                                                 
63 A weighted average of daily wages for farm workers given by Jörberg, History of Prices,I, pp. 601–603 for various 
counties (daily wages per county weighted by the countryside population in these counties in 1910 according to 
the population census) was 2.60 kr in 1913. If we assume 10.3 hours per day of work we arrive at an hourly wage 
of 0.25 kr. 
64 See Bohlin, ”Tariff protection” and Bidrag till Sveriges Officiella Statistik. 
65 Nanneson, ”Räkenskapsresultat”, pp.  30–33, 62–66. 
66 Ibid., pp. 57–62. 
67 For the cost shares of fertilizer for various crops in 1911/14, see ibid., pp. 62–65. 
68 Ljungberg, Priser och marknadskrafter, Bidrag till Sveriges Officiella Statistik. 
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Appendix 2: Benchmark data for CGE model 
 
APPENDIX 2 TABLE 1. Final demand and supply, 1913 m kr  
 Final Demand 
 
 
Supply 
 
 
 Private 
consumption 
(excl. of trade 
margins) 
Public 
consumption 
Investments Exports Imports (incl. of 
tariffs) 
Gross output 
EXP_IND 7.645  0.000 364.000 33.545 569.800 
CAP_IND 241.459  153.000 186.500 194.009 945.000 
CONS_IND 511.011  0.000 37.600 156.511 572.600 
FOOD_VEGE 506.826  0.000 5.100 40.110 601.400 
FOOD_ANIM 92.206  0.000 71.800 9.006 168.600 
CONSTRUCT 0.000  321.900 0.000 0.000 452.000 
SERVICES 1217.100  0.000 225.700 0.000 1767.000 
PUBLICSERV  264.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 264.000 
FORESTRY 66.569  0.000 21.000 1.069 276.000 
AGRI_BREAD 50.000  0.000 0.300 79.100 195.900 
AGRIV_VEGE 35.000  0.000 7.000 14.300 235.200 
AGRI_ANIM 386.400  0.000 21.700 6.600 555.500 
RAWMAT 12.200  0.000 0.000 246.800  
NC_AGRIC 30.500  0.000 0.000 133.100  
Sources: See Appendix table 5 
 
 
APPENDIX 2 TABLE 2. Factor payments and capital stock (1913 m kr). Employment (1000s) 
 Wage sum. 
Urban 
employees 
(incl. of 
income taxes) 
m. kr 
Wage sum. 
Rural 
employees 
(incl. of 
income taxes) 
m. kr 
Surplus (incl. 
of income 
taxes) m. kr 
Value added.
m. kr. 
Urban 
employm. 
(1000s) 
Rural 
employm. 
(1000s) 
Capital 
m. kr. 
EXP_IND 127.4013  116.1587 243.56 119.1  359.2 
CAP_IND 278.287  156.253 434.54 211.4  501.2 
CONS_IND 173.9153  69.0347 242.95 191.6  255.4 
FOOD_VEGE 51.3898  106.5262 157.916 51.7  209.9 
FOOD_ANIM 13.1456  1.4544 14.6 12.8  23.3 
FORESTRY  69.904 78.799 254.8  100 49 
AGRI_BREAD  86.7497 67.6503 86.7497  128.9 892.9 
AGRI_VEGE  104.1804 80.2196 104.1804  154.8 1380.8 
AGRI_ANIM  194.5643 101.9357 194.5643  289.1 1875.8 
CONSTRUCT 200.655  46.345 250.2 193.846  10.5 
SERVICES 411.343 142.769 960.688 1514.8 370.83 268.7 3715 
PUBLICSERV 175.011 0 1.899 176.9 110.154  578 
Sources: See Appendix table 5. 
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APPENDIX 2 TABLE 3. Consumption data for formulation of Stone-Geary utility function, m. kr 
 
 Baseline consumption  Total private consumption (incl. of trade margins) Implied income elasticity of demand 
EXP_IND 5.000 9.997 0.66 
CAP_IND 7.200 315.733 1.28 
CONS_IND 63.000 668.201 1.19 
FOOD_VEGE 370.000 662.729 0.58 
FOOD_ANIM 25.000 120.569 1.04 
CONSTRUCT 0.500 0.500 0.00 
SERVICES 10.000 620.400 1.29 
FORESTRY 63.700 87.046 0.35 
AGRI_BREAD 43.000 65.380 0.45 
AGRI_VEGE 30.200 45.766 0.45 
AGRI_ANIM 120.000 505.259 1.00 
RAWMAT 3.800 15.953 1.00 
NC_AGRIC 9.400 39.882 1.00 
 
APPENDIX 2 TABLE 4. Elasticities used in counterfactual simulations 
 CES, elasticity of 
substitution 
Armington elasticity 
of substitution 
CET, elasticity of 
transformation 
Export demand 
elasticity 
EXP_IND 0.5 2 2 2 
CAP_IND 0.5 2 2 2 
CONS_IND 0.5 5 5 5 
FOOD_VEGE 0.5 5 5 5 
FOOD_ANIM 0.5 5 5 5 
CONSTRUCT 0.5 — — — 
SERVICES 0.5 — — — 
FORESTRY 1 2 2 2 
AGRI_ BREAD 1 10 10 10 
AGRI_VEGE 1 5 5 5 
AGRI_ANIM 1 5 5 5 
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APPENDIX 2 TABLE 5. Benchmark tariffs on imports (%) 
 Tariff 
EXP_IND 0 
CAP_IND 10 
CONS_IND 15 
FOOD_VEGE 30 
FOOD_ANIM 3 
AGRI_BREAD 25 
AGRI_VEGE 0 
AGRI_ANIM 3 
FORESTRY 0 
CONSTRUCT 0 
SERVICES 0 
PUBLICSERV 0 
RAWMAT 0 
NC_AGRIC 20 
 
 
Income taxes 
An income tax of 4.7 percent is levied on the income of all factors 
Sales tax 
A sales tax of 5 percent is levied on the output of the FOOD_VEGE sector. 
Domestic savings 
The difference between post-tax factor incomes, after deduction of depreciation on fixed capital69, and the 
value of total private consumption is saved. Accordingly, the savings rate of the representative consumer 
is computed as (Factor incomes – income taxes – depreciations – total private consumption)/ (Factor 
incomes – income taxes – depreciations). In the benchmark it is 9.2 percent. This savings rate is applied in 
all counterfactual simulations. Private savings and depreciations are transferred to “the Investor”. 
Foreign savings 
Apart from depreciations and private savings the Investor also receives or transfers foreign exchange to 
the outside world. Debt service on foreign debt contracted in earlier periods is 78.8 m kr. There is also an 
inflow of emigrant remittances amounting to 36 m kr. The difference between imports (exclusive of 
tariffs) and exports is filled by foreign savings. Hence foreign savings in the benchmark is: Imports – 
exports – emigrant remittances + interest payment on foreign debt. In the counterfactual simulations 
foreign savings adapt to ensure that total investments = total savings.  
 
 
 
                                                 
69 The following depreciation rates on sector specific capital stocks are assumed: EXP_IND 0.03236, CAP_IND 
0.03183, CONS_IND 0.0356, FOOD_ANIM 0.03462, FOOD_VEGE 0.0346, 0.0346, CONSTRUCT 0.05, 
SERVICES 0.0249, PUBLICSERV 0.02507, FORESTRY 0.05, AGRI_BREAD 0.01, AGRI_VEGE 0.01, 
AGRI_ANIM 0.0286. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 6. Input-output table of the Swedish economy 1913, m kr 
 EXP_IND CAP_IND CONS_IND FOOD_VEGE FOOD_ANIM CONSTRUCT SERVICES PUBLICSERV FORESTRY AGRI_BREAD AGRI_VEGE AGRI_ANIM 
EXP_IND 77.600 37.300 16.900 3.100 0.300 62.000 20.500 10.000 0.000 1.000 2.000 1.000 
CAP_IND 14.690 352.760 16.000 3.100 0.200 82.000 29.000 19.000 4.000 14.200 22.100 1.000 
CONS_IND 0.000 2.700 136.500 6.800 0.000 7.000 7.500 19.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
FOOD_VEGE 0.000 0.000 1.000 124.584 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.000 
FOOD_ANIM 0.000 0.000 13.100 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CONSTRUCT 1.900 1.200 3.600 1.900 0.500 0.000 63.000 27.000 0.000 7.300 14.700 9.000 
SERVICES 32.500 39.500 22.900 25.300 5.600 54.000 93.100 7.100 17.200 8.000 12.000 7.000 
PUBLICSERV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FORESTRY 179.750 4.800 4.950 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AGRI_BREAD 0.000 0.000 0.000 202.600 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 22.100 
AGRI_VEGE 0.000 0.000 0.000 22.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 185.400 
AGRI_ANIM 0.000 0.000 7.000 0.000 147.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RAWMAT 19.800 72.200 93.200 4.900 0.400 0.000 39.100 5.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NC_AGRIC 0.000 0.000 14.500 48.600 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.000 0.000 29.500 
Sources: See separate working paper. 
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